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Abstract 
What determines countries’ successful transition to democracy? Research has focused on 
socioeconomic and institutional factors, yet the assumption that political liberalization has to 
precede democratization has not been systematically examined. We explore the impacts of 
granting civil rights in authoritarian regimes and especially the gendered aspect of this process. 
We argue that both men’s and women’s liberal rights are essential conditions for democratization 
to take place: giving both men and women rights reduce an inequality that affects half of the 
population, thus increasing the costs of repression for authoritarian rulers, and enabling the 
formation of women’s movements – historically important as a spark of protests in initial phases 
of democratization. We test this argument empirically using data that cover 160 countries over 
the years 1900–2012 and contain more nuanced measures than commonly used. Through 
sequence analysis we obtain results suggesting that liberal rights for both men and women 
enhance civil society organizations, and then lead to electoral democracy. The results suggest that 
influential modernization writings – stressing the role of economic development in 
democratization processes – may partly have been misinformed in their blindness for gender. 
The reported pattern may be at least part of the explanation of the ‘Arab spring’ failures. 
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 “The majority of the mainstream democratization literature has remained gender blind, with 
very little to say about the participation of women in transitions to democracy or the gendered 
nature of those processes” (Waylen 2003, p. 157) 
 
1. Introduction 
Is the improvement of women’s civil rights a necessary condition for countries to democratize? 
There are some early studies discussing the evolution of citizen rights and their sequence. For 
instance, Marshall’s (1950) seminal work suggested that legal rights come first and, followed by 
political and social rights, that participatory rights were the final stage of this sequence (see also 
Janosky 1998). The literature has also long been pointing out the distinction between political 
liberalization and democratization, and how the process of liberalization tends to precede a 
democratic transition (Linz and Stepan 1996, Przeworski 1991). Political liberalization includes 
the elimination or reduction of state repression and extension of civil liberties. It is believed that 
once authoritarian rulers ease their control over citizens, citizens have more opportunities to 
challenge existing political leaders and institutions. With liberal rights, citizens have a stronger 
standing in the public sphere and are better able to organize in political movements to demand 
democratic rights, and hence improving the overall participatory environment and increasing the 
cost of repression for authoritarian rulers. 
However, as Davenport (2007) has pointed out, these insights have not been 
systematically examined; despite the conceptual importance of distinguishing between the two 
processes, they are seldom operationalized separately in the quantitative analysis. Does the 
entitlement of civil rights always precede the establishment of competitive elections for political 
leaders and thus constitute a precondition for democratization? One reason that this question 
has not yet been thoroughly investigated is that some scholars believe that the protection of 
liberal rights is an aspect of democracy (Beetham 1999). The two processes tend to be highly 
correlated and temporally close to each other, and therefore the relationship between them is 
difficult to explore. 
Another deficiency in the literature is that when stressing the importance of civil rights, 
research has remained gender blind and has not addressed that the development of civil rights 
for women tends to lag behind the rights of men. It is not clear if it is necessary to achieve some 
degree of gender equality with regard to civil rights before democratization. However, the 
connections between the rights of women and democratic outcomes have been discussed in 
early works. For instance, Tocqueville (1835) argued that the expanded educational opportunity 
 4 
for women goes along with a society more receptive to democracy. Mill (1869) proposed that 
without the right to vote, women would in fact not develop the skills of active citizens. 
Case study evidence suggests that women have been among the first to speak up against 
authoritarian rule in Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile and Brazil (Waylen 1994), 
in Sub-Saharan African countries (Tripp 2001) as well as in some countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa (Arat 1994, Moghadam 2008). Women’s organizations, often being outsiders 
of conventional politics, have in numerous settings been operating under the radar of 
authoritarian regimes oppressing established opposition parties and extending the space allotted 
for civil society organizations, thus creating a foundation for protests in the initial phases of 
transition (Arat 1994, Waylen 2007). Based on samples that mostly span across the past twenty-
five years, quantitative studies also identified that more equal distribution of education between 
women and men (Barro 1999, Fish 2002, Sanborn and Thyne 2013), female labor force 
participation (Wyndow et al. 2013), and the conception of gender equality as a part of broader 
cultural changes (Inglehart et al. 2002), are factors that contribute to democratization. 
There are two literatures on democratization that bolster our expectations about these 
connections. On the one hand, a macro-level literature that focuses on structural factors lends us 
to reason that the “costs of repression” is increased as half of the population increasingly gain 
the rights to move, discuss and hold material and immaterial assets. On the other hand, a 
literature with a micro-level focus informs our argument that such rights have in fact been crucial 
for enabling the organization of women’s movements that in a range of countries have initiated 
protests that led to transitions. By exploring the effects of empowerment of men and women 
separately, and examining the consequences on regime changes when women’s rights lag behind, 
our argument departs from the current transition literature. More specifically, we hypothesize 
that if women are denied basic liberties and rights, then they will have a lower standing on the 
labor market and in the public sphere. Once women enter the workforce, they have an increasing 
demand for redistribution and public goods provision, such as low-cost daycare, which are 
linked to a political regime more responsive to the needs of its people. In addition, only when 
women have basic liberties and rights are they able to develop the skills required to organize 
movements that oppose authoritarian rule. Parallel to the argument holding that economic 
inequality is a determinant for democratization (cf. Lipset 1959, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), 
we believe that this inequality in civil liberties and rights between men and women – such as 
whether or not women are free to move, discuss and to hold material and immaterial assets – 
will affect women’s demands for redistribution and their organizational capacity, and thus the 
costs of repression.
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We identify three lacunas in the scope of the current research: first, the often-mentioned 
assumption that political liberalization has to precede democratization has not been 
systematically examined. Second, there is a literature on democratization that seldom has focused 
on whether or not the rights of women are an important prerequisite for successful transition to 
take place. Third, there is a literature on gender and politics that has focused on democratization, 
yet mostly on the impact of such processes on gendered outcomes, such as women’s political 
representation and the effectiveness of women’s movements (Paxton et al. 2006, Viterna and 
Fallon 2008, Paxton et al. 2010, Viterna et al. 2010, Fallon et al. 2012), but that has not explored 
women’s rights as a determinant for successful democratization. Moreover, the current state of 
research has some limitations in methods. One the one hand, the few qualitative case studies that 
analyze women’s organizations in liberation processes focus on single countries and over a 
limited period of time. On the other hand, the existing quantitative studies that examine the 
relationship between gendered indicators and outcomes in democratization only study the most 
recent decades and use regression frameworks whereby it is difficult to identify the temporal 
relationship between variables and deal with endogeneity issues. 
Our approach aims to remedy some of these problems. We utilize a newly collected 
dataset on both men’s and women’s rights, and measures of countries’ transitions to democracy 
that, covering more than 160 countries for the years 1900 to 2012, are more detailed than 
commonly used. Moreover, we use a novel sequencing method that focuses on investigating the 
temporal process of events. In doing so, we are able to more systematically theorize and examine 
the relationships between liberal rights in various dimensions and democratic transitions. 
The results from this analysis suggest that to gain electoral democracy a country first 
needs to give liberal rights to both women and men. We demonstrate that the improvement of 
civil rights is indeed a necessary condition for democratic transition to take place. In addition, we 
point out the importance of women’s rights, and show that civil rights of both genders are 
crucial: only when both men and women have enjoyed certain levels of civil liberties, leading to 
increased civic skills in the population and a strengthening of civil society organizations, are 
regime changes more likely to occur. 
These findings challenge influential thinking stemming from modernization theory, 
which holds that “dictatorships die as countries ruled by them become economically developed” 
(Przeworski and Limongi 1997, p. 156). In contesting this perspective, we agree with Waylen in 
stating that “any analysis of democratization that fails to incorporate a gendered perspective – 
that ignores the actions and impact of certain groups – will be flawed” (1994, p. 327). Economic 
development leads to democratization only if the process brings about the enhancement of both 
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men’s and women’s civil liberties. We thus propose that future research on democratization and 
regime transitions would benefit from increasingly taking gendered aspects into account. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in the following section, we discuss theories linking civil 
liberties and democratic transitions, with a focus on the importance of women’s rights. Next, we 
describe the sequence analysis approach, and specify data and measures utilized in this paper. We 
then present the empirical results. We conclude by outlining the implications of these findings 
and discuss the limitations and future extensions of the study. 
 
 
2. Women’s Rights and Democratization 
In explicating our theoretical expectations we build on two types of reasoning in the scholarship 
on democratization, one focused on 1) changes in class power and demands for redistribution, 
and another on 2) mass behavior and participatory civil society. 
 
2.1. A Macro-Level Approach: Liberal Rights and the Cost of Repression 
Influential democratization scholars have discussed the role of economic development, the 
middle class, and economic distribution in transitions. Lipset (1959) states that there are social 
prerequisites for the rise and persistence of democracy, such as the affluence and prosperity of a 
country. Accordingly, economic development tends to reduce income inequalities and create a 
large middle class who may act as a political force to induce democratic reforms. We use theories 
on how income inequality affects democratization to craft a gendered version of this structural 
reasoning. 
The literature focusing on the relationship between economic inequality and 
democratization identifies that resource redistribution from the rich/rulers to the poor/ruled is 
the natural consequence of regime transitions. Thus, the challenge to the authoritarian power 
structure comes from the lower classes, who wish to change the redistributional equilibrium in 
the society through democratization (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, Boix 2003). Therefore, the 
possibility of a democratic transition is conditional on the relative costs of repressing the 
organized opposition of lower classes compared to the potential costs of redistribution under a 
future democracy, from rulers’ point of view. At high levels of economic inequality, “the cost of 
redistribution surpasses that of repressing revolts. The elites hence repress the population and 
there is no democratization” (Houle 2009, p. 592). However, as the distribution of assets and 
income becomes more equal among individuals, the redistributive impact of democracy 
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decreases, and repressing oppositions by force becomes less attractive (Boix 2003, Chacón 2012). 
As a democratic tax structure preferred by the median voter becomes less expensive to the rich, 
the probability of a transition to universal suffrage increases. The costs of repression relative to 
redistribution are not only determined by the levels of inequality, but also affected by sources of 
income of the elites (Moore 1966, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). When capital owners tend to 
rely on labor repressive institutions rather than cooperative mechanisms in the workplace to 
generate revenues, having a democratic system is especially expensive to them. 
While this reasoning refers to the general economic equality in a country, one may see 
this thinking very well be applicable to a gendered understanding of such processes, that is, why 
the strength (or absence) of civil liberties for women may be important for such transitions to 
take place. First, let us remember that democracies are more prone to grant women – one half of 
the population – a larger share of the resources and power than autocracies, since the preference 
of the median voter is likely to shift policy toward a more woman-friendly standpoint. Second, 
we should recall that most authoritarian regimes are ruled by men. They have – parallel to the 
argument on income equality between the rich and the poor in society – also much to lose if 
women may ask for their share of the cake. We therefore believe that countries where women 
are denied their basic rights – highly gender unequal countries – are less likely to democratize 
since the cost of redistribution surpasses that of repressing revolts (cf. Houle 2009) and the elite 
will have much to lose in letting democratic elections decide their future. 
In addition to reducing the general inequality in a country, the improvement of civil 
liberties for women also raises the demands for wealth redistribution and a democratic tax 
structure through two avenues. First, as Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006) point out, women’s 
policy interests change as they enter the workforce. Since women are more likely to be the 
primary care givers, working mothers’ welfare is largely affected by the availability of some public 
infrastructure, such as low-cost child day care. As studies find, at any given level of income, 
working women prefer more social protection than both men and housewives (Greenberg 2000, 
Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). The demands for social welfare policies are linked to a political 
regime more responsive to its citizens’ needs. That is, once more women obtain basic liberties, 
such as property rights and the freedom of movement, and enter the workforce, the general 
preferences for social policies increase, which are more likely to be achieved in a democratic tax 
structure. 
The second avenue is that the advances in women’s civil rights, which are helpful in the 
improvement of their economic participation, produce many additional socio-economic gains 
and can lead to a growing middle class. A strong middle class has long been considered as a key 
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factor in explaining democratization, either as the driver of the transition process or as a buffer 
in the conflict between the elite and the citizens (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Studies point 
out that women are more likely than men to save and reinvest their earnings to their household, 
and thus the increased gender equality in rights and resources helps reduce household poverty 
and improve the well-being of their next generation (Frey and Field 2000, Jowett 2000, Morrison 
et al. 2007). That is, since women tend to contribute more to family income than men, the 
improvement of women’s rights is expected to more effectively change the class structure by 
reducing household poverty and enlarging the middle class. 
Based on these arguments, we propose that the absence of civil liberties and rights for 
women can be viewed as another type of inequality that affects the “costs of repression”. In 
addition, the improvement of women’s rights increases the costs of repression not only by 
reducing the general inequality in a country, but also by increasing the demand for redistribution 
and enlarging the middle class through women’s labor participation and earnings. 
 
2.2. A Micro-Level Approach: Women’s Abilities to Organize Themselves in 
Movements 
The other reasoning is focused on mass behavior and draws on scholarship on gender and 
politics that has discussed how women’s labor market involvement produces civic skills that 
affects their capacity for political participation as well as how women’s organization in 
movements for democratic reform may be crucial during transitions. As stated by Weingast 
(1997), for scholars of democratization “mass behavior is relevant because citizens must 
coordinate their reactions to prevent violations of democratic rights” (p. 246). 
A fundamental change occurring in a society in which women receive rights, such as 
freedom from slavery and the right to hold property, is that it will witness an increasing share of 
women on the formal labor market. There is ample research on the effects of increasing 
participation of women in the formal labor market. Iversen and Rosenbluth (2008) discuss early 
liberal’s resentment of British coverture laws, that is, where fathers or husbands controlled the 
labor of dependents and wives: 
“As long as women are not allowed to own their labor, they argued, women lack the 
motivation or capacity to be morally responsible. Without resources of their own, females 
connive to get what they want from males, and being disenfranchised they have no incentive to 
become informed and constructive citizens” (p. 8). 
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In this line of reasoning, it is conceivable that an active engagement in the labor market 
may foster skills crucial for political participation and democracy movements. As Matland (1998) 
states, this process “has a consciousness raising effect on women's political participation and 
their propensity to articulate political demands” (p. 118). Research from both developed and 
developing countries suggests that women who are established in the labor market and form an 
identity from such experiences, are more likely to be interested in and participate in conventional 
politics (e.g. Welch 1977; Schlozman et al. 1999; Chhibber 2002). Ross (2008) summarizes these 
findings: “When women enter the workforce they become more likely to engage in 
conversations that promote an interest in politics, to join informal networks that facilitate 
collective action and help them develop their civic skills” (p, 108). Moreover, there may be a 
“spill-over” effect from gaining such skills: “Women, who enter the labor force, may also 
become part of greater organizational networks such as trade unions and business groups; 
groups where they are very likely exposed to politics” (Stockemer and Byrne 2013, p. 4). 
Along with this process on the labor market that generates the civic skills necessary for 
participation, the granting of rights – specifically the freedom of domestic movement, the 
freedom of discussion, and access to justice and power – will tend to spur women to organize in 
civil society associations. This is a feature we believe to be crucial. In fact, research from a range 
of countries suggests that women’s organizations played key roles during initial phases of 
opposition to authoritarian regimes. 
This literature gives anecdotal insights in where such movements have mattered. 
Focusing on Latin America, Waylen (1994) notes that groups in the 1970s in authoritarian Chile 
and Argentina campaigned against human rights violations. One example is the Argentine las 
Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) that would rally on a certain city square, 
carrying pictures of their disappeared children. In the 1980s groups emerged in Brazil, Chile and 
Peru that trough popular movements focused on the “politics of daily life” that struck women 
harder economically than men. For instance, in the urban protests during the 1980’s against 
repression in authoritarian Brazil, 80 % of the people are believed to have been women (Waylen 
2007, p. 57). Waylen also notes women’s groups appearing under authoritarian rule in Latin 
America that made strategic gender-based demands, and whose participants were often active in 
left-wing politics before military rule. 
Writings on protest movements in the Middle East and North Africa suggest that 
women’s organizations have played important roles in countries such as Turkey and Iran (Arat 
1994; Moghadam 2004, 2010). It is said that “[i]n Morocco, women’s groups were central actors 
in the country’s democratization during the 1990s” (Moghadam 2008, p. 11). 
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With regard to sub-Saharan Africa, women’s organizations have played important roles 
in the move toward electoral democracy. In South Africa, women’s organization had a 
tremendous impact in the struggle against apartheid (Waylen 2007). Moreover, Tripp (2001) 
gives numerous examples of African countries where democratization processes were sparked by 
protests organized by women: 
“In Kenya, the early 1990s saw women at the forefront of often violent protests in 
support of imprisoned human rights activists. In Mali, thousands of demonstrating women and 
children were fired on by the forces of President Moussa Traoré in a series of events that led to 
his downfall. In Sierra Leone … women were the only group that openly defied soldiers and 
demonstrated for a free vote. In Guinea, women organized a sit-in in front of the presidential 
palace in Conakry… Finally, in Niger, several thousand women demonstrated against the 
exclusion of women representatives from a preparatory commission charged with organizing the 
country’s National Conference in 1991” (p. 142–143). 
This vein of research also illustrates how and when these movements mattered. 
Importantly, studies suggest that women’s organization throughout history have filled an 
organizational void in authoritarian systems that were originally perhaps less threatened by these 
groups. Arat describes how women in Turkey during the 1980s did this through “extending the 
space allotted to civil society organizations” (Arat 1994). Similarly, in Latin America authoritarian 
systems allowed women’s organizations “space to mobilize” (Waylen 1994, p. 339) and in 
absence of conventional politics allowed these groups influence through new modes of 
participation. 
Research suggests that these organizations may function as a first spark for protests 
toward democratic change. Waylen (1994) argues that the impact of women’s movements is 
important in initial phases of transition, before conventional forms of politics take form. As 
outsiders to orthodox politics, women’s groups “formed the first organized and open opposition 
to authoritarian governments, helping to bring about the ‘end of fear’” (p. 339). In Chile, for 
instance, one of the first mass protests against the Pinochet regime was supposedly held to 
celebrate the International Women’s Day in 1978. Similarly, Tripp notes that women’s groups in 
African countries undergoing transitions “were among the first to take advantage of new 
openings to establish a wide array of formal and informal associations at both the local and 
national levels” (2001, p. 147). 
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Besides the direct organization of women’s movements, there are also other important 
effects to consider. Sanborn and Thyne (2013) notes that “even when females do not lead 
movements, the breaking of traditional norms of gender inequality empowers male leaders of 
democratization movements to lead more effective movements, recognizing that females can 
play a crucial role in agitating for political change” (p. 779). In such situations, they argue, that 
the rights given to women may strengthen political opposition as a whole: “When male leaders 
of political liberalization movements in Guatemala came to appreciate the power of female 
movements in the region, for example, they supplemented their ranks and extended leadership 
positions to females” (Sanborn and Thyne 2014, p. 779). 
What these studies on women’s role in protest movements suggest is that women’s 
presence in the public sphere was crucial for successful transitions. Importantly, the absence of 
civil rights and liberties for women should therefore have the opposite consequence, where a 
large share of the population will remain in the private sphere, reluctant to engage in political 
activities. As Jaquette (2001, p. 116) points out: “[Such states] are also patriarchal, hindering 
women’s access to capital, land, and credit. Because women are marginalized from formal 
politics and their issues are ‘depoliticized’ they prefer to manage their affairs autonomously 
instead of engaging in public protests and organization.” This reasoning suggests that states that 
deny women basic rights will tend to face less pressure from demands of political change. 
In tandem, our macro-level and micro-level discussions outline that we expect civil 
liberties to be a condition for successful transitions to democracy. By granting civil rights to a 
larger share of population, citizens are better able to organize politically and challenge the 
regime, and the costs of repression increase, which consequently strengthen the possibility of 
democratic transitions. Within this framework, we focus on the importance of women’s rights, 
and point out several mechanisms linking female liberties and regime changes. In countries 
where women have civil liberties and rights, the costs of repression for authoritarian rulers tend 
to be larger than in countries where half of the population is not granted such rights. Since 
women in settings without rights often lack experience of engagement in public life, such as 
working formally or engaging in political movements, they tend to stay in the domestic sphere 
and are less aware of the prospects of wealth redistribution. Moreover, these countries are less 
likely to have protest movements, and when they do, they are more easily oppressed by elites, 
since a smaller share of the population will engage in these. Therefore, the successful transition 
to democracy is expected to be more common after women have obtained civil liberties and 
rights.  
 
 12 
To summarize our reasoning, Figure 1 outlines the different stages of the macro- and 
micro-level processes in which women’s rights condition successful transitions. It has to be 
noted that, in this paper, we mainly investigate the extent to which male and female civil liberties 
constitute a necessary condition for democratic transitions, and whether women’s participation 
in civil society organizations is a mechanism linking improvement in liberal rights and the 
establishment of electoral democracy. Within this framework, other difference mechanisms will 
be examined in further work. 
 
Figure 1: How women’s rights condition successful transitions to democratic rule 
 
 
 
 
3. Methods 
More or less inspired by comparable analyses in biology, scholars have developed several 
approaches to identifying sequences in time-series data in the social sciences. For example, 
inspired by studies on DNA sequence analyses, social sequence analyses identify the similarity of 
sequences, and have been proposed to explore the temporal order of discrete events analyzed by 
social scientists, such as life course trajectories, job careers, decision-making, and crisis (Abbott 
1995, Abbot and Tsay 2000, Casper and Wilson 2015, Gauthier et al. 2010). However, the 
phenomena we are interested in here, the relationship between levels of female empowerment 
and successful democratic transitions in different countries and years, involve more than one 
variable measured mainly on an ordinal scale. To explore combinations of changes in these 
various variables over time, we have implemented several approaches, including fixed-effect 
regression with one year lag in the dependent variable, frequency and dependency analyses, a 
modified version of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987, Rihoux and Ragin 
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2009), as well as a Bayesian dynamical systems approach (Spaiser et al. 2014; Ranganathan et al. 
2014a). We will also use a novel graphical approach to investigate relationships between changes 
in two ordinal variables. 
 
3.1. Frequency Analysis 
To explore the temporal relationship between two variables we investigate whether one of them 
in general tends to be larger than the other. We therefore construct a frequency table including 
all possible combinations of the values of these two variables. An example of such a frequency 
table for two sample variables, Variable A and Variable B, is shown in Table 1. To calculate the 
frequency of each combination, for each country, we first combine several yearly observations 
when the values of both variables do not change into one observation and count them as one 
“event”, regardless of how many years that combination is stable. Then we count the 
occurrences of each combination. 
Table 1: Example of a frequency table of observed combinations of values of two 
variables 
 
  Variable A 
  0 1 2 3 
Variable B 
0 4 3 1 0 
1 1 3 5 1 
2 0 0 3 4 
3 0 0 0 3 
 
3.2. Graphical Investigation of Changes 
Frequency analyses allow us to explore how often one variable is larger than another, but do not 
really clarify how this comes to be. To further investigate the exact pathways for how variables 
change, we have used a graphical approach. The rationale for this approach is elaborated upon in 
Appendix A. 
To create the plots indicating temporal changes in two variables, we first construct a 
table listing all the observed changes in values of the two variables, then produce a figure 
mapping all these changes (see the Results section). We report two types of figures. In the first, 
we map all changes using arrows indicating movement between states, where the thickness of 
each arrow is proportional to the number of changes that have occurred along that particular 
path. We have also added circles in the graphs to indicate the number of times that particular 
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combination of states is the end result of a change – the size of each circle is proportional to the 
number of “landings” on that particular combination. These are comparable to the numbers 
reported in the frequency tables, except that the initial state for each country is not included in 
the figures1. We arbitrarily chose “landings” over all observations to better give an indication of 
the direction of change.  
The other type of figure reveals reform paths that are more popular than expected by 
utilizing observed data of the end result of changes (indicated by the circles in the first type of 
figures) to calculate a table of expected values using chi-square methodology from the 
distribution of each variable. Graphing the difference between the table of observed and the 
table of expected values reveals reform paths that are more popular than would be expected by 
the distribution of the two variables alone (see the Results section). 
If one wants to draw conclusions about sequences from these graphs, the proposed 
approach assumes that variables change along a similar scale, with a similar step size, with each 
categorical score indicating a similar magnitude, and that no parts of the transition processes are 
systematically underestimated. It may be tempting to use observed and expected tables discussed 
in the previous paragraph to also calculate the chi-square statistic, but since the two tables may 
differ for reasons other than there existing popular reform paths, a significance value is not 
meaningful – hence the visual inspection is of crucial importance. If significance tests are 
deemed desirable (we urge caution as this requires that many assumptions are fulfilled), we 
instead recommend quasi-symmetric model tests for comparing off-diagonal values in square 
tables (Agresti 2002) utilized on the observed frequencies. 
 
3.3. Dependency Analysis 
To explore whether certain values of one variable are systematically conditional on certain values 
of other variables in the existing data, we have adopted something akin to a bare-bones version 
of QCA, here termed dependency analysis. The method is inspired by “the contingent states 
test,” which was an early method developed to investigate dependencies in biological evolution 
(Sillén-Tullberg 1993), and is particularly well suited to use on sequence data outside biology. To 
conduct this type of dependency analyses, for each value of one variable, we scan the dataset for 
the lowest value in the others. If higher values in Variable A always correspond to higher “lowest 
values” in Variable B, then it can be inferred that certain values of Variable A are likely to be 
                                                      
1 Note that in our examples, changes going up and going down are mapped simultaneously as there are no 
important differences between the paths in the two directions in our data, regarding which side of the diagonal 
changes tend to occur, though theoretically these may differ substantially. 
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conditional on certain values of Variable B. If, simultaneously, for each value of Variable B, the 
corresponding “lowest value” in Variable A is its minimum, then this shows that Variable B is 
not restricted by Variable A. These two observations in combination indicate that potential 
dependencies between the two variables exist only in one direction. Dependency should not be 
taken here as a causal relation between A and B, but only that certain values for a variable are 
conditional on certain values for the other variable in the available observations. 
Note that even though Variable A and Variable B may covary, this method checks for 
absolute dependencies in the data, not statistical correlations. To allow some margin of errors, a 
percentile of observations can be specified and treated as the “lowest values,” which will slightly 
relax the criterion of absolute dependencies. We here report both absolute dependencies and 
dependencies allowing a 95% “wiggle-room,” as is sometimes implemented in QCA. 
Table 2 shows an example of such a procedure. The left table (a) indicates that higher 
states (2 and 3) in Variable A occur only together with higher values in Variable B (2 and 3, 
respectively). The right table (b) indicates no such dependency, with the exception that Variable 
B is never 3 if Variable A is not at least 1. Thus, variable A is likely dependent on changes of 
Variable B having taken place at several stages, while in the opposite direction there is a 
dependency only in that B cannot obtain the maximum value while A is at its minimum. 
 
Table 2: Examples of dependency tables 
(a)  
Variable A 
Lowest value of 
Variable B 
    (b)  
Variable B 
Lowest value of 
Variable A 
 0 0  0 0 
 1 0  1 0 
 2 2  2 0 
 3 3  3 1 
 
3.4. Bayesian Dynamical Systems Analysis 
Democratic development can sometimes be abrupt and clearly nonlinear, suggesting threshold 
values that change the speed or direction of development (Lindenfors et al. 2011; Jansson et al. 
2013; Spaiser et al. 2014). In order to study nonlinear dynamics in the interaction between 
variables, and to potentially identify threshold values for the development of democracy and civil 
liberties, we also employ a newly developed Bayesian dynamical systems approach that models 
the probable reform direction of countries depending on state combinations. This method 
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identifies the best nonlinear functions that capture the interactions between variables. Bayes 
factors are employed to decide how many interaction terms should be included in the model, 
with a punishment for overly complex models. The method gives a pair of differential equations, 
modeling how the values in each of the two variables involved affect the direction of each. From 
this, we can infer which is the most likely trajectory a country will follow, given any starting 
point. The resulting dynamical system can be illustrated by a phase portrait, where the 
trajectories are depicted with arrows. The method is described in full in two papers by Spaiser et 
al. (2014) and Ranganathan et al. (2014b).2 
It is important to note that the method provides a system for the entire set of possible 
values for the two variables. That is, it uses all the data points and provides a general description 
for the entire system, including combinations of the two variables that do not occur in the data. 
For illustrative purposes, we do not plot the arrows for these points in the phase portraits. 
 
4. Data and Measures 
To explore the temporal relationship between the improvement of civil rights for both genders 
and democratic transitions, we utilize the data collected by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
project. This is a new dataset that collects data on more than 300 indicators measuring different 
dimensions of democracy in 173 countries around the world from 1900 to 2012. Different from 
exiting datasets, which usually relied on a small group of experts who rated all countries or asked 
each expert to code one single unit, the V-Dem project invited over 2,500 local and cross-
national experts to provide judgments on various indicators about democracy (Coppedge et al. 
2011, 2014). Experts’ ratings are aggregated through a Bayesian item response theory model 
(Pemstein et al. 2014). The model takes into account the possibilities that experts may make 
mistakes and have different scales in mind when providing judgments. In addition, bridging-
coders, experts who coded multiple countries, were recruited to calibrate the scales of estimates 
cross-nationally. 
We define democratic transition as “any significant move toward mass democracy” (cf. 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2001, p. 938). We follow a focus in the literature on free and fair 
elections as well as multiparty competition as the core element of democracy (see Diamond 
2015, p. 141). To measure the existence of free and fair elections, we utilize the electoral 
component index developed by Jan Teorell and included in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 
                                                      
2 We have used the R package bdynsys (Ranganathan et al. 2014b) to carry out the computations. The program 
presents the models that best fit the data using up to six terms. Unless otherwise mentioned, we have used the 
differential equations with the largest Bayes factors among these. 
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2014). The electoral component index intends to measure the extent to which the electoral 
principle of democracy is achieved in the country. That is, whether political leaders in a country 
are selected through the mechanisms of competitive elections, and thus have to be accountable 
to their citizens at least to some extent. The index combines indicators on the level of suffrage, 
freedom to join political and civil society organizations, whether elections are clean and without 
systematic irregularities, and whether the chief executive is selected through elections. 
The V-Dem dataset includes several measures on levels of civil liberties. We utilize the 
indicators with regard to five features: freedom of domestic movement, freedom from forced 
labor, freedom of discussion, property rights, and access to justice. All these indicators are 
measured on the scale of 0 to 4, where 0 represents no freedom at all, and 4 means full freedom. 
These five indicators are measured for men and women separately. They capture the extent to 
which citizens in a country are able to move freely, to discuss, and to have a basic share of 
property. If they are denied the rights, it is difficult for them to organize collectively and engage 
in political movement against authoritarian rule. 
For these indicators, the measurement model produces interval-level estimates of latent 
traits roughly in a normal distribution, with 0 as the average and 1 as the standard deviation. For 
the sequence analyses, which require ordinal variables, we take the corresponding normal 
cumulative probability of each value and divide them into five ordinal categories based on the 
probabilities for all these variables3. The highest categories on the indicators of electoral 
component index indicate that in the country, suffrage is extensive, elections are clean, the chief 
executive is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections, and political parties operate freely. 
That is, the highest category on the aggregate electoral index can be defined as a successful 
transition to electoral democracy, and any increase on the index can be viewed as improvement 
in democracy. 
The measure of a mechanism, women’s participation in civil society organizations 
(CSOs), linking liberal rights and electoral democracy is also from the V-Dem dataset. The 
indicator captures whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations, 
and high values indicate no such incidence. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
3 For the sequence analysis, the pairwise variables are comparable in the sense that they both refer to probabilities 
associated with the values. The (normalized) probabilities of the continuous versions are still used in the Bayesian 
dynamical systems approach. 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Frequency and Dependency Analysis 
To examine the temporal relationship between civil liberties and the development of the 
electoral principle of democracy, we first compared male and female civil rights. To calculate the 
frequency of each combination, for each country, we first combined several yearly observations 
when the values of both variables did not change into one observation and counted them as one 
“event”, regardless of how many years that combination was stable. Then we counted the 
occurrences of each combination. We created frequency tables listing all the observed 
combinations between male and female civil liberty indicators, and then, as described in the 
methods section, calculated the percentage of observations where males had higher levels of civil 
liberties than females, in comparison to the opposite cases. Table 3 includes these percentages. 
The relative percentages in Table 3 show that in the majority of cases, men have civil 
rights that are higher than or equal to those of women. Given the large disparity with respect to 
men’s rights having larger values than women’s rights versus the opposite, it is likely that male 
civil liberties tend to change before female civil liberties, especially when it comes to property 
rights and freedom of domestic movement, but less so for access to justice and freedom from 
forced labor, while the freedom of discussion mostly develops simultaneously for men and 
women. Note, by comparisons with frequency tables in Appendix D, that the frequencies are 
similar when civil rights are getting better as when they are getting worse. 
 
Table 3: Relative frequencies of male and female civil liberties 
A = Males, B = Females % when A > B % when A = B % when A < B 
Property rights 48 44 8.6 
Freedom of domestic movement 37 55 8.1 
Access to justice 27 62 11 
Freedom from forced labor 26 60 14 
Freedom of discussion 19 59 22 
 
Then we compared the levels of both male and female civil liberties with scores of the 
electoral component index. Table 4 lists the percentages of observations where the values of the 
civil liberty indicators are greater than the values of the electoral component index, in 
comparison to observations where the values of the electoral index are greater. Note, by 
comparisons with frequency tables in Appendix D, that the frequencies are similar when civil 
rights and the electoral component index are moving up as when they are moving down 
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Table 4: Relative frequency table of civil liberties and the electoral principle of 
democracy 
Variable A = Electoral 
component index 
 
Variable B 
% when B > A % when B = 
A 
% when B < A 
Property rights for men 92 8.5 0.1 
Freedom of domestic movement for men 90 8.3 1.4 
Freedom of domestic movement for women 85 13 1.8 
Property rights for women 80 16 3.7 
Freedom from forced labor for men 79 18 3.3 
Freedom from forced labor for women 74 20 5.2 
Freedom of discussion for men 60 32 8.6 
Freedom of discussion for women 59 31 9.6 
Access to justice for men 55 32 13 
Access to justice for women 49 35 16 
 
 
The relative frequencies included in Table 4 shows that the electoral component index 
generally has lower values than property rights for men and women, freedom of domestic 
movement for men and women, and freedom from forced labor for men and women, but also, 
to a lesser degree, freedom of discussion for men and women and access to justice for men and 
women. Given the large disparity between the values for civil rights and the electoral component 
index, it is likely that a country’s civil rights tend to attain high values before its performance on 
the electoral index achieves an equivalent level (assuming similar scales on all variables). Note 
that our results are not simply the consequence of differences in variable distributions, as the 
plots of observed versus expected indicates clear reform paths where civil rights score higher 
values than the electoral component index (see below, Fig. 4). It is likely that the development of 
both male and female civil rights is a precondition for having competitive elections. We have 
also constructed frequency tables for different subsamples, and found that the same pattern 
prevails for the early democracies, the third wave democracies, and when the post-communist 
countries are excluded (see Appendix B). 
To investigate if having competitive elections depends on the development of both 
male and female civil rights, we conduct dependency analyses. Table 5 documents, across all 
observed combinations, countries’ minimal scores for the civil rights indicators when the country 
scores 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 on the electoral index. Numbers within parentheses are the absolute 
minimal values, while numbers outside parentheses are the fifth percentiles, which allow 5% 
margins of error. For example, there is no country scoring 2 on the electoral index when its level 
of property rights for men is not at least 4, or 2 if one allows for a 5% wiggle-room. 
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Table 5: Dependency table of the electoral component index on civil liberties 
 
Electoral component index 0 1 2 3 4 
Property rights for men 1 1 4 (2) 4 (3) 4 (4) 
Property rights for women 1 1 2 (1) 3 (1) 4 (2) 
Freedom of domestic movement for men 1 2 3 (2) 4 (2) 4 (2) 
Freedom of domestic movement for women 1 1 2 (2) 3 (2) 4 (3) 
Access to justice for men 1 1 2 (1) 2 (1) 3 (2) 
Access to justice for women 1 1 2 (1) 2 (1) 3 (3) 
Freedom from forced labor for men  1 2 (1) 3 (2) 4 (3) 
Freedom from forced labor for women 1 1 2 (1) 3 (2) 3 (3) 
Freedom of discussion for men   2 3 (1) 3 (2) 
Freedom of discussion for women   2 3 (1) 3 (2) 
 
Table 5 clearly suggests that the electoral component index is conditional on pre-
existing high levels of a number of civil liberties, both for men and women. For a country to 
achieve certain levels on the electoral index, the country needs high scores for the indicators of 
property rights, freedom of domestic movement, and freedom from forced labor for both men 
and women. The dependency is less strong, but still clear on the indicators of freedom of 
discussion and access to justice for both men and women. The results suggest that civil liberties 
for both men and women are important for a country to have competitive elections. 
 
Table 6: Dependency table of civil liberty indicators on the electoral component index 
Electoral component index 0 1 2 3 4 
Property rights for men      
Property rights for women      
Freedom of domestic movement for men      
Freedom of domestic movement for women      
Access to justice for men     4 (1) 
Access to justice for women     4 (3) 
Freedom from forced labor for men      
Freedom from forced labor for women      
Freedom of discussion for men     3 (1) 
Freedom of discussion for women     3 (1) 
 
To rule out the possibility that the development of civil liberties may also depend on 
the quality of elections, that is, that the minimal values presented in Table 5 are due to 
correlations and not temporal dependencies, Table 6 shows the reversed descriptives to those in 
the previous table. The numbers in Table 6 are countries’ minimal scores on the electoral 
component index when the country scores 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 for these civil liberty indicators. The 
table shows that only few values of few civil liberties are dependent on the electoral component 
index. Only for the highest score of freedom of discussion and access to justice for both 
genders, the country’s elections need to achieve certain levels of competitiveness. These figures 
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suggest that free and fair elections are helpful for the development of certain civil liberties to the 
highest possible levels, but in most cases, it is the electoral principle of democracy that depends 
on civil liberties, not the other way around. 
The frequency and dependency tables presented in Table 3 to Table 6 show the 
pairwise relationships in the data between the electoral index and civil rights indicators, and 
between male and female civil rights. The results suggest that civil rights for men tend to develop 
ahead of civil rights for women. However, as is also indicated in these tables, the advances in 
male civil rights do not constitute a sufficient condition for regime changes. Civil rights for men 
and women are both important and have both to reach certain levels before the country has free 
and fair elections. Regardless of the levels of male civil rights, if female civil rights are limited and 
have not achieved certain values, then it is difficult for a country to experience democratic 
transitions. To verify that these patterns are not due to the effects of confounding factors, we 
also utilize the conventional fixed-effect regression analysis to control for variables identified as 
crucial predictors of democratization. The results of the regression models are included in 
Appendix C, and show that both men’s and women’s rights are correlated with the emergence of 
competitive elections, even when the effects of economic development, income inequality, and 
oil production per capita, are controlled for. 
After establishing the relationship between the electoral index and civil liberty 
indicators, we further investigate whether women’s participation in civil society organizations 
constitutes a mechanism linking the improvement of civil rights and democratization. Table 7 
lists the percentages of observations where the indicator of women’s participation in CSOs has a 
value greater than the electoral component index, in comparison to observations where the 
values of the electoral index are greater. The table shows that in most cases, countries have a 
higher score on the indicator of women’s participation than the electoral component index. It is 
likely that women’s participation in the civil society tends to improve before the country’s 
performance on the electoral index achieves an equivalent level. 
 
Table 7: Relative frequency table of women’s participation in civil society organizations 
and the electoral principle of democracy 
Variable A = Electoral component 
index 
% when B > 
A 
% when B = 
A 
% when B < 
A 
Variable B: CSO women’s participation 56 25 19 
 
Table 8 compares the levels of both male and female civil liberties with scores of the 
indicator of women’s participation in CSO. The relative frequencies show that countries’ scores 
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on certain types of civil liberties for both genders, especially property rights, freedom of 
domestic movement, and freedom from forced labor, tend to be higher than their electoral 
component index. This pattern is less clear for other civil rights indicators. Table 9 and 10 
further show the dependency analyses between women’s involvement in civil society movement 
and civil liberties. Similar to Table 5 and 6, Table 9 documents, across all observed 
combinations, countries’ minimal scores for the civil rights indicators when the country scores 0, 
1, 2, 3, or 4 on the indicator of women’s CSO participation, while Table 10 includes the reverse 
scores. These two tables suggest that, in general, women’s participation in CSO is dependent on 
the improvement of civil liberties for both genders to some extent. Only for the highest score of 
freedom of discussion and access to justice for both genders, does the country need to achieve 
certain levels on the civil society indicators. That is, in most cases, it is women’s involvement in 
civil society movement that depends on civil liberties, not the other way around. However, these 
dependency relationships are not as strong as those between electoral democracy and civil 
liberties, shown in Table 4–6. In some cases, civil rights and women’s involvement in civil 
society improve at the same time. 
 
Table 8: Relative frequency table of civil liberties and women’s participation in civil 
society organizations 
Variable A = CSO women’s 
participation 
 
Variable B 
% when B > 
A 
% when B = A % when B < A 
Property rights for men 70 23 7.6 
Freedom of domestic movement for men 68 23 9.2 
Freedom of domestic movement for women 58 28 14 
Property rights for women 56 28 16 
Freedom from forced labor for men 51 30 19 
Freedom from forced labor for women 44 32 24 
Freedom of discussion for women 31 33 36 
Freedom of discussion for men 32 31 37 
Access to justice for men 30 28 43 
Access to justice for women 23 28 49 
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Table 9: Dependency table of CSO women’s participation on civil liberties 
 
CSO women’s participation 0 1 2 3 4 
Property rights for men 1 1 (1) 2 (1) 1 4 (2) 
Property rights for women 1 1 1 1 2 (1) 
Freedom of domestic movement for men 1 2 2 (1) 2 (1) 3 (1) 
Freedom of domestic movement for women 1 2 2 (1) 2 (1) 3 (1) 
Access to justice for men 1 1 1 (1) 1 1 (1) 
Access to justice for women 1 1 1 (1) 1 1 (1) 
Freedom from forced labor for men  1 1 2 2 (1) 
Freedom from forced labor for women 1 1 1 1 (1) 2 (1) 
Freedom of discussion for men   1 2 3 
Freedom of discussion for women  1 1 1 1 
 
Table 10: Dependency table of civil liberty indicators on CSO women’s participation 
 
CSO women’s participation 0 1 2 3 4 
Property rights for men      
Property rights for women      
Freedom of domestic movement for men      
Freedom of domestic movement for women      
Access to justice for men     4 (2) 
Access to justice for women     4 (3) 
Freedom from forced labor for men      
Freedom from forced labor for women     1 
Freedom of discussion for men     3 (1) 
Freedom of discussion for women     4 (2) 
 
The frequency and dependency analyses in Table 7 to Table 10 suggest that women have to be 
sufficiently involved in civil society organizations before the country has free and fair elections. 
In addition, the improvement of certain civil rights for both men and women, especially property 
rights and freedom of domestic movement, constitutes an important condition for women being 
active in the public sphere. The analyses in this section establish the likely sequential relationship 
between the improvement of civil rights, women’s participation in CSOs, and electoral 
democracy. 
5.2. Graphical Presentation of Changes 
The frequency and dependency analyses suggest that countries tend to score higher for both 
male and female civil rights than on the electoral index, and that the electoral index is dependent 
on pre-existing civil rights, but not the other way around. To further verify the direction of 
changes, and ensure that our results imply a development in male and female civil liberties before 
the establishment of free and fair elections, we plot all changes for the electoral index and 
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different civil right indicators. Figure 2 shows all the observed pathways of changes, and Figure 3 
compares the frequencies of the observed and the expected pathways. The figures for access to 
justice and forced labor are included in Appendix D. 
The figures are consistent with our hypotheses that civil liberties for both men and 
women tend to develop first, before the emergence of free and fair elections. Similar to what 
frequency and dependency analyses show, across the different types of civil rights, the quality of 
elections especially depends on high scores for property rights and freedom of domestic 
movement, and, to a lesser degree, on certain levels of freedom of discussion4. Figure 3 also 
indicates that the reform paths where the civil rights are strengthened first and competitive 
elections then start to take place, are the most common reform paths, based on the comparison 
between the observed and expected frequencies. 
Figure 4 shows all the observed changes for the electoral index and the indicator of 
women’s participation in CSOs. Consistent with the observations in the frequency analysis, the 
involvement of women in civil society movements tends to take place before the establishment 
of electoral democracy. Figure 5 includes the pathways of changes for the civil society indicator 
and different civil rights indicators, and the figure further suggests that women’s participation in 
CSOs is especially conditional on the improvement of property rights and freedom of domestic 
movement for both genders.  Note, however, that the figures indicate an initial increase in 
electoral democracy at very low levels of women’s participation in civil society movements. 
Based on the graphical approach and the results of frequency and dependency analyses, the likely 
sequential relationships and the direction of changes between liberal rights, the strength of civil 
society, and electoral democracy are established. Liberal rights of both men and women have to 
be strengthened first, and the advance in certain rights especially leads to women’s increased 
involvement in movements, which is consequently helpful for electoral democracy to arise. 
 
5.3. Bayesian Dynamical Systems Analysis 
To model changes in values of civil rights indicators and the electoral component indicators at 
different levels, and identify potential non-linear relationships between them, we adopt the 
Bayesian dynamical systems approach. The equations with the highest Bayes’ factors for property 
                                                      
4 We also conducted sequence analyses to explore the temporal relationships between different types of civil rights. 
The results are shown in Appendix B. They suggest that property rights for both genders tend to develop first, 
which is followed by the improvement of freedom of domestic movement and freedom from forced labor for both 
men and women. Freedom of discussion and access to justice then change later, and are followed by the emergence 
of free and fair elections. 
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rights (variable x) and the electoral component index (variable y) are the following for male 
property rights: 
!" = 0.063 − 0.0012 1! !− 0.067! !!!" = (0.09 − 0.35! + 0.25!!)! + 0.017!! 
And for female property rights: 
 !" = (0.046 − 0.049!)!!!" = 0.088 − 0.35! + 0.25!! ! + 0.023!! 
 
Figure 6 plots the trajectories given by the equations. For illustration and comparison, 
the figure also shows actual trajectories in the past for six arbitrarily selected countries, as 
examples. The results suggest that, at low levels of both variables, the electoral index can grow 
roughly independently of property rights. However, as the index reaches values higher than 0.34, 
it requires more and more property rights, for both men and women, in order to increase. With 
high scores on the property rights indicators, the electoral index cannot stay at low values; while 
with low scores on the property rights indicators, it is not possible for the electoral index to 
remain high. While increases in the electoral component index depend on property rights, and 
while property rights grow linearly with the electoral component index, the direction does not 
depend on it. In addition, countries are estimated to pass approximately through the point (0.9 
on the male property rights indicator, 0.5 on the electoral index). The estimated dynamics 
between the property rights for women and the electoral index are quite similar to those between 
the indicator for men and the electoral index. However, the results suggest that property rights 
for women seem to have slightly greater impacts on the index. 
The equations with the highest Bayes’ factors for freedom of discussion (variable x) and the 
electoral component index (variable y) are the following for male freedom of discussion: 
!" = 0.057 + 0.041!! − 0.094! !!!" = 0.12 − 0.46! + 0.32!! ! + 0.04!! 
 
And for female freedom of discussion: 
 !" = (0.052 + 0.036!! − 0.085!)!!!" = 0.1 − 0.44! + 0.31!! ! + 0.044!! 
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Figure 7 plots the trajectories given by the equations. We have also here included 
examples of actual trajectories. The dependence of the electoral index on freedom of discussion 
is similar to property rights, but freedom of discussion also depends on the electoral index in 
order to surpass 0.5. 
If we include both male and female civil rights together with the electoral component 
index in the same dynamical system, then the rate of change in both male and female civil rights 
depends roughly linearly on the electoral component index, as in the separate systems. For the 
electoral component index, female rights appear to be more important than male rights. The 
equations with the highest Bayes’ factors include only the index itself and female rights as 
affecting the rate of change. Male and female rights, however, are highly correlated, so this fact 
should not be interpreted as male rights not being important, but it suggests that female rights 
are somewhat better predictors of increased in the electoral component index. Also, men’s 
freedom of discussion improves more with higher values in women’s freedom of discussion, 
while the dynamical system shows no evidence of the opposite. 
The equations for female (x) and male (y) property rights and the electoral component index (z) 
are: 
!" = (0.046 − 0.049!)!!!" = 0.063 − 0.067! − 0.0012 1! z!!" = 0.088 − 0.35! + 0.25!! ! + 0.023!! 
The equations for female (x) and male (y) freedom of discussion and the electoral component 
index (z) are: 
 !" = 0.052 − 0.085! + 0.036!! !!!" = (0.08 − 0.19! + 0.12!")!!!" = 0.1 − 0.44! + 0.31!! ! + 0.044!! 
 
The dynamic system analyses suggest that while all the previous approaches point out 
the dependency of the electoral index on civil liberty indicators, there is some non-linearity 
between them. The more nuanced complexities involved in this dependency relationship require 
further studies to illustrate. 
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6. Concluding Discussion  
This paper departed by discussing the theoretical reasons why women’s rights may matter for a 
country’s successful transitions toward democratic rule. We pointed specifically to macro-level 
factors regarding gender inequality in rights and the cost of repression as well as micro-level 
aspects of how women’s labor market involvement produce civic skills that affect their capacity 
for political participation as well as how women’s organization in movements for democratic 
reform may be crucial during transitions. We conducted an empirical test of this reasoning that is 
more comprehensive than previous studies in this vein of research. Expert assessments covering 
over 160 states over the years 1900–2012 allow us to make inferences that span over a longer 
period of time and across more countries than in earlier research. 
In this paper we offer systematic analyses on the oft-mentioned relationship between 
political liberalization and democratization. From a gendered aspect, we especially point out the 
importance of women’s civil rights. Utilizing sequence analysis approaches focusing on the 
temporal relationships between variables, and a novel cross-sectional time-series dataset 
including disaggregated measures of various dimensions of democracy, we show that both men’s 
and women’s liberal rights are essential conditions for democratization to take place. Men’s civil 
rights attain high values sooner than women’s civil rights. However, women’s civil rights are 
somewhat predictive of possible improvement in men’s civil rights, and regardless of the levels 
of male civil rights, if female civil rights are limited, it is difficult for a country to experience 
democratic transitions. In addition, the improvement of certain liberal rights for both genders 
leads to women’s increased involvement in the civil society, which is helpful for electoral 
democracy to take place. We find that this pattern is robust also when analyzing subsets of this 
data, such as time periods with the earliest democracies. The results suggest we should put more 
effort into exploring women’s participation in the transition process. 
Other potential mechanisms through which the advances in women’s rights lead to a 
successful transition, such as women’s participation in the formal labor force, require further 
studies to verify. For the moment we are unable to say much about the mediating effect from 
some key variables that we mention in our argument. We currently show that women’s political 
movements tend to arise after the improvement of certain liberal rights and before the electoral 
component index achieves its maximum value, and constitute a mechanism in this process. 
However, due to lack of data availability, we cannot examine how women’s inclusion in the labor 
market mediates the effect from women’s rights on democratic status. 
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These findings have implications for both researchers and policy-makers. We point 
towards the necessary role of rights for women. In doing so, the findings suggest that influential 
modernization writings – stressing the role of economic development in democratization 
processes – and the theoretical discussion on the evolution of different rights (cf. Marshall 1950; 
Janosky 1998), generally neglecting rights of different sexes, may partly have been misinformed. 
Our findings contradict some of the more influential theories of democratization, holding that 
economic development is a necessary condition in this process (see e.g. Przeworski and Limongi 
1997). Rather, our findings suggests that there are important gendered dimensions of this 
process, and especially that the sequencing of rights to women is crucial. The gendered feature of 
this process has, until now, rarely been studied in a comparative perspective. In this sense, we 
confirm some of the insights gained by qualitative studies of women’s organization in 
democratization processes. 
Pertaining to a discussion relevant for policy-makers, the results hold the promise to 
improve our understanding of current challenges for further democratization of regions where 
women’s rights are weak. This may, for instance, provide insights into why so few countries were 
successfully democratized during the so-called Arab spring: during these years only one country, 
Tunisia, upheld democratic gains. While the future of countries in this region is difficult to 
predict, the democracy scholar Larry Diamond recently noted: “Tunisia remains full of promise. 
Alone among the Arab Spring states, it has achieved a remarkable level of political compromise 
among secular parties” (Diamond 2015). As Figure 8 shows, based on the averages of the five 
civil liberty indicators for women, Tunisia was, at the same time, the country in the region with 
the most rights for women.    
For further analyses, we expect to develop a refined way to draw inferences from our 
approaches, and examine cases with similar sequences to see whether they share some features. 
Future research could benefit from further disentangling the sequential relationship between 
rights among men and women and the democratic standing of a country. We especially invite a 
further use of multi-method research that combines the strength of different approaches and 
hope that other researchers may continue to advance the discussion we hope to engage in. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
Figure 2: The pathways of changes in civil liberty indicators and the electoral index. 
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Figure 3: Comparison between observed and expected pathways of changes in civil liberty indicators and 
the electoral index. “Ridges” (positive numbers) indicate reform paths that are more popular than 
expected by variable distributions alone, while “rifts” (negative numbers) indicate the opposite. 
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Figure 4: The pathways of changes in women’s participation in CSOs and the electoral index. 
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Figure 5: The pathways of changes in civil liberties and women’s participation in CSOs 
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Figure 6: Phase diagrams given by the Bayesian dynamical systems for property rights and the electoral 
index 
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Figure 7: Phase diagrams given by the Bayesian dynamical systems for freedom of discussion and the 
electoral index 
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Figure 8: Women’s liberal rights in Arab Spring countries 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Theoretical background to the graphical investigation of 
ordinal sequences 
 
For two binary variables, both of which take the values as 0 and 1, there are three ways for two variables 
to change from (0, 0) to (1, 1). Either Variable A can change first to (1, 0), both can change 
simultaneously to (1, 1), or Variable B can change first to (0, 1). Thus, to determine how often Variable A 
becomes 1 before Variable B, one simply counts the number of changes from (0, 0) to (1, 1) that go via 
(1, 0) and compare this number to the number of changes from (0, 0) to (1, 1) that are direct, or via (0, 1) 
(Figure A1a). This counting results in a frequency table similar to Table 1, but for binary characters with 
only four possible combinations. 
 
For ordinal variables with multiple values the situation is more complex. Consider two comparable 
ordinal variables (Variable A and Variable B) varying along the same scale with the same step size – in our 
example all variables can take on the integer values 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4. The question of interest is again if one 
variable tends to be larger (or smaller) than the other after a change. Partly, the general thinking is similar 
– if Variable A tends to be larger than Variable B then changes ending above the diagonal will be more 
common than changes ending below the diagonal (Figure A1b). 
 
Partly, however, the situation is entirely different, because a multitude of other potential paths are 
possible. For example, one variable may become larger first at lower values while the other becomes 
larger first at higher values, variables may go in both directions or variables may be unrelated but one 
variable has a skewed distribution, a pattern that would result in more changes ending on one side of the 
diagonal even if no correlation exists between the two variables. Often, we may not observe processes 
from scratch, but in the middle of transitions, which would mean that we miss parts of the process for 
each country. If, for example, A tends to be larger than B in the beginning of a transition, and the 
opposite in the end, then we would underestimate the occurrences of A > B if we lack more beginnings 
than ends of transitions. Further, and most importantly, the variables may not be comparable – how does 
the value 2 for freedom of speech truly compare to a value 2 of gender equality? Thus, it is important to 
visually inspect the movement graphs – because of this, we term the approach graphical rather than 
statistical. 
 
Figure A1: Some of the potential pathways of change in (a) two binary variables and (b) two comparable 
categorical five state variables. 
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Appendix B: Frequency Analysis for Subsamples 
 
Table B.1 to B.3 show frequency analyses for different subsamples. The results suggest the pattern that 
civil rights score higher values than the electoral component index prevails for the early democracies, the 
third wave democracies, and when the post-communist countries are excluded. 
 
Table B.1: Relative frequency table of civil liberties and the electoral principle of democracy (1900-1945) 
Variable A = Electoral component 
index 
 
Variable B 
% when B > 
A 
% when B = A % when B < A 
Property rights for men 85 14 .01 
Freedom of domestic movement for men 78 18 3.6 
Freedom of domestic movement for women 75 20 5.5 
Property rights for women 75 20 4.1 
Access to justice for men 68 28 3.7 
Freedom of discussion for men 67 28 5.6 
Freedom from forced labor for women 64 30 6.1 
Freedom from forced labor for men 61 32 7.3 
Access to justice for women 58 36 6.2 
Freedom of discussion for women 54 37 8.6 
 
Table B.2: Relative frequency table of civil liberties and the electoral principle of democracy (1974-2012) 
•  
Variable A = Electoral component index 
Variable B 
% when B > 
A 
% when B = 
A 
% when B < 
A 
Freedom of domestic movement for men 80 17 3.3 
Property rights for men 79 17 4 
Freedom of domestic movement for women 78 17 4.9 
Property rights for women 75 20 4.8 
Freedom from forced labor for women 67 25 8.3 
Freedom from forced labor for men 66 27 7.2 
Freedom of discussion for women 57 32 11 
Freedom of discussion for men 57 30 13 
Access to justice for men 55 31 15 
Access to justice for women 51 34 15 
•  
  
 44 
Table B.3: Relative frequency table of civil liberties and the electoral principle of democracy (post-
communist countries excluded) 
•  
Variable A = Electoral component index 
Variable B 
% when B > 
A 
% when B = 
A 
% when B < 
A 
Property rights for men 83 14 2.9 
Freedom of domestic movement for men 81 16 3.4 
Freedom of domestic movement for women 79 16 4.8 
Property rights for women 75 19 5.7 
Freedom from forced labor for women 68 24 8.3 
Freedom from forced labor for men 66 26 8.2 
Access to justice for men 61 28 11 
Freedom of discussion for men 59 28 12 
Freedom of discussion for women 55 32 12 
Access to justice for women 54 33 14 
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Appendix C: Regression Analysis 
 
We utilize hierarchical linear regression analysis to control for the effects of potential confounding 
factors. The results are presented in Table A.1. The dependent variable of all the models is the electoral 
component index. The five civil liberty indicators for men and women are included in Model 1 to 5 as the 
independent variables. As the literature has suggested (Acemoglu et al. 2008, 2009), we include country 
fixed effects and time dummies to capture various institutional differences across countries and common 
trends of democratic transitions. The one-year lagged value of the dependent variable on the right-hand 
side is included to capture persistence in the quality of elections. Other control variables, such as the 
levels of economic development, income inequality, and oil production per capita, are also included5 since 
they have been identified as strong predictors for democratization in previous studies (see Acemoglu et al. 
2009, Barro 1999, Boix and Stokes 2003). In the regression analyses, the dependent variable is one year 
ahead of all the independent variables. 
 
The results suggest that except for freedom from forced labor for women, all other types of civil liberties 
for both men and women are significantly positively correlated to the quality of elections. Similar to the 
results of the Bayesian dynamical system analysis, among different types of civil liberties, with regard to 
property rights and freedom of discussion, women’s rights seem to have greater effects than men’s rights 
on the electoral index; while with regard to freedom of domestic movement, access to justice, and 
freedom from forced labor, men’s rights have larger impacts. Overall, the regression analyses show that 
both men’s and women’s rights are correlated with the emergence of competitive elections. It has to be 
noted that even though all independent variables are lagged by one year, it is still difficult to identify the 
temporal relationships between the improvement of electoral quality and civil rights for both genders by 
regressions. Whether there is a temporal lag between the empowerment of men and women is also not 
clear from these models. Sequence analyses are intended to deal with these issues. 
 
  
                                                      
5 See the V-Dem Codebook (Coppedge et al. 2014) for the data sources of these controls. 
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Table C.1: Regression analysis on the relationship between civil liberties and the electoral principle of 
democracy 
 
 DV: Elec tora l  component  index 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Civil liberty indicator 
= 
Property 
rights 
Freedom of 
domestic 
movement 
Access to 
justice 
Freedom 
from forced 
labor 
Freedom of 
discussion 
Female civil liberty 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.008 0.040*** 
 
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] 
     Male civil liberty 0.016*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.026*** 
    [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] 
      (log) GDP per Capita 0.008* 0.002 -0.000 0.012*** 0.005 
    [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] 
      GINI -0.0004** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0004** -0.0009*** 
 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
     Urbanization 0.048* 0.039* 0.081*** 0.029 0.039* 
 
[0.019] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] 
     GDP growth Rate 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 
   Rate [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
      (log) Petroleum  -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003** -0.002* 
   production [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
      Electoral componentt-1 0.756*** 0.699*** 0.661*** 0.752*** 0.601*** 
    [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] 
_cons -0.0214 0.0432 0.102** -0.0359 0.0901** 
 
[0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.032] 
     N  7566 7566 7566 7566 7566 
Countries 128 128 128 128 128 
adj. R-sq 0.795 0.803 0.807 0.796 0.817 
• Country and year fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets. * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. All 
independent variables are lagged by one year. 
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Appendix D: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table D.1: Relative frequencies of male and female civil liberties when change was positive 
 
A = Males 
B = Females 
% when A > B % when A = B % when A < B 
Property rights 44 50 5.7 
Freedom of domestic movement 36 58 5.9 
Freedom from forced labor 30 61 9.6 
Access to justice 26 64 9.9 
Freedom of discussion 20 61 18 
 
Table D.2: Relative frequencies of male and female civil liberties when change was negative 
 
A = Males 
B = Females 
% when A > B % when A = B % when A < B 
Property rights 51 33 16 
Freedom of domestic movement 38 51 11 
Access to justice 28 58 14 
Freedom from forced labor 16 61 23 
Freedom of discussion 17 57 26 
 
Table D.3: Relative frequency table of civil liberties and the electoral principle of democracy when 
change was positive 
 
Variable A = Electoral component index 
Variable B 
% when B > 
A 
% when B = 
A 
% when B < 
A 
Property rights for men 87 13 0.0 
Freedom of domestic movement for men 86 12 1.6 
Freedom of domestic movement for women 79 18 2.5 
Freedom from forced labor for men 71 26 3.6 
Property rights for women 69 26 4.8 
Freedom from forced labor for women 64 30 6.6 
Freedom of discussion for men 49 40 11 
Freedom of discussion for women 48 43 9.3 
Access to justice for men 39 44 17 
Access to justice for women 31 50 20 
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Table D.4: Relative frequency table of civil liberties and the electoral principle of democracy when 
change was negative 
 
Variable A = Electoral component index 
Variable B 
% when B > 
A 
% when B = 
A 
% when B < 
A 
Property rights for men 98 1.8 0.0 
Freedom of domestic movement for men 97 2.5 0.7 
Freedom of domestic movement for women 94 5.7 0.7 
Property rights for women 94 5.4 0.9 
Freedom from forced labor for women 92 6.0 2.0 
Freedom from forced labor for men 90 7.6 2.3 
Access to justice for men 76 19 5.2 
Access to justice for women 74 20 5.7 
Freedom of discussion for women 73 21 5.8 
Freedom of discussion for men 70 23 7.0 
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Figure D1: Pathways of changes in civil liberty indicators and the electoral index 
 
 
 
Figure D2: Comparisons between observed and expected pathways in frequency matrices of changes in 
civil liberty indicators and the electoral index, indicating reform paths that are more utilized than expected 
from the distribution of the variables alone. 
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